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1. Introduction 
 
The minimum wage in Colombia is established through negotiations between 
representatives of the workers' union and an employers' association in December every year. If 
they fail to reach an agreement, the government establishes the minimum wage. Only in three out 
of the last eight years there has been an agreement between both parties. 
 
The minimum wage is a key element of economic and social policy in developing countries. The 
minimum wage affects not only workers in the formal sector, but also many prices and taxes 
which are set based on it in Colombia. For this reason, the policy with respect to the minimum 
wage is significant in Colombia where approximately 56 percent of all workers earn the minimum 
wage (Hernandez and Pinzon 2006, 12) and 73 percent of all workers affiliated to the social 
security system earn two or less minimum salaries (Arango, Herrera and Posada 2007, 14).  
 
Furthermore, the minimum wage is the base level for wages in the formal sector. Although there 
are different explanations as to what is considered informal and formal, there seems to be a 
consensus with regard to the ease of joining the informal sector because there are no entry 
barriers. In the formal sector, on the contrary, labor laws, company regulations, and fixed 
minimum wages, among others, have become entry barriers. In this context, government 
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intervention in the economy via the determination of the minimum wage generates incentives to 
either join or leave the informal sector; for example, the minimum wage generates incentives to 
choose one sector. In this article we assume that those who work in the informal sector have 
actually chosen to do so.  
 
Compared to other approaches to the problem, this paper differs in several aspects. Firstly, this 
review involves a follow-up of the informal sector from 2001 to 2005 based on the construction of 
a pseudo panel. Secondly, we assume the minimum wage to be an opportunity cost to join the 
informal sector. With the data available from 2001 to 2005 we built six cohorts based on 
information of 13 metropolitan areas, from the informal sector in the National Household Survey 
from last June. This selection provides a sample of 89,241 individuals for the period under review. 
Another contribution of this paper is the discussion of the higher minimum wages over labor force 
participation. In the standard WGM two-sector model, Welch (1976), Gramlich (1976), Mincer 
(1976), a higher minimum wage implies low wages in the uncovered or informal sector because 
of the movements from the formal to the informal sector, and the employment effects are negative 
in the informal sector and positive in the formal sector, Lemos (2009). Yet it is possible that the 
effects of the higher minimum wages on employment in the informal sector are moderate due to 
the substitution effects between young and older workers in the labor participation in the informal 
sector. This characteristic is particularly important in developing countries where the informality 
rate is high, and the total effect of the higher minimum wage over informality depends on the 
proportion of young/older workers over the total labor force participation in the informal sector 
 
This paper is organized as follows: the second section discusses the literature about the effects 
of the minimum wage on employment and on both the formal and informal sectors. The third 
section presents a model and describes the methodology for modeling the engagement in the 
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informal sector based on pseudo panel data. The fourth section presents estimates of the model 
using an instrumental variable probit and presents the correction of the selection bias. We 
conclude in the last section. 
 
2.  Literature Review  
 
The theory suggests that the impact of minimum wages on the labor market depends 
either on competitive or non-competitive assumptions. In a competitive labor market, minimum 
wages established above the market equilibrium wage result in unemployment. In a monopolistic 
labor market, if the minimum wage is above the monopsony wage level (but below the 
competitive level), employment will increase.  
 
Literature shows ambiguous effects of the minimum wage on the unemployment rate. Card and 
Krueger (1994) found that the restaurants in New Jersey, where the minimum wage was raised, 
expanded the workforce in comparison to restaurants in Pennsylvania. However, using different 
data, Newmark and Washer (1995) found an increase in unemployment in New Jersey. Castillo-
Freeman and Freeman (1992) found that in Puerto Rico a 10% increase in the minimum wage 
caused an employment reduction of 5%. With respect to the results of Castillo-Freeman and 
Freman (1992), Krueger (1995) showed that the results are statistically fragile. Bell (1997) found 
that in Mexico the minimum wage has had no effects on wages in the formal employment sector, 
but found substantial unemployment effects associated with the minimum wage in Colombia. 
Suryahadi et al. (2003) discuss the substitution effects: minimum wage decreases employment of 
unskilled workers and increase employment of white-collar workers. 
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In developing countries, Lemos (2007) showed that higher minimum wages in Brazil are 
associated with a reduction of inequality but not with lower employment. Lemos (2009) also 
showed that the employment effects are due to assumptions of the segmented or integrated labor 
market.  
 
In Colombia, Magnac (1991) provides the first contrast of informality in Colombia. In Magnac's 
(1991) bivariate probit model, the informal sector is identified with self-employment (excluding 
employers). The obtained results reject a segmented labor market hypothesis. However, 
Magnac’s model shows that when an individual chooses to work in the formal sector, the benefits 
associated with not working are indistinguishable from the benefits of working in the informal 
sector.  
 
Núñez (2002) suggests that joining the informal sector in Colombia is a voluntary action of which 
individuals are aware. Why should one choose one sector or another? Núñez (2002) believes that 
there are several factors that encourage participation in the informal business sector since there 
is a lenient environment that facilitates evasion of labor-related taxes. This refers to evasion of 
taxes such as tax withholding at the source and other state-imposed taxes based on a formal 
employment agreement. However, Nuñez (2002) fails to discuss the effects of truncated sampling 
in his results when calculating the informal participation of individuals who earn more than 
$1,200,000 Colombian pesos. Ribero (2003) and Uribe et al. (2006) modeled informal 
employment as the result of socioeconomic characteristics of an individual, where education has 
a negative effect on the likelihood of participating in the informal sector. Depending on the 
purpose of the study, other variables have been included such as age, position in the household, 
non-labor income, gender, and fertility. Ribero (2003) did not make a selection bias adjustment, 
and Uribe et al. (2006) did not include the selection correction in his calculations.  
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Finally, Hernández and Pinzon (2006) discussed the effect of increase of minimum wage on labor 
participation using pooled data and found that there are substitution effects on workers with an 
increase in the minimum wage. However, Hernández and Pinzon (2006) did not consider the 
pseudo panel measurement error due to the nature of the Colombian data - the official 
information by the Colombian Department of Statistics does not include the possibility of panel 
data - and does not discuss the substitution effects through the cohorts2.  
 
3. Model Specification 
 
The labor force participation shows individuals that maximize their utility over 
consumption and leisure, subject to budget constraints and dependent upon the time available for 
these activities, Gronau (1973), Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Pencavel (1986), Killingsworth 
(1986) and Brue and Macpherson (2003). 
 
In developing countries, the standard WGM two-sector model, Welch (1976), Gramlich (1976), 
Mincer (1976), shows that when a group of workers is outside the umbrella of minimum wage 
legislation, a minimum wage increases implies that wages in the uncovered sector fall as a result 
of displaced workers in the covered sector moving into uncovered sector employment. Then the 
wage effect is expected to be positive in the covered sector and negative in the uncovered sector, 
Lemos (2009).   
 
It is evident that the prediction of the WGM model implies segmentation in the labor market. In 
Colombia, Arango and Posada (2001) suggest the possibility of segmentation based on a 
                                                 
2 There is no consensus about the effect of the minimum wages on employment in Colombia. While Maloney and 
Núñez (2003) found a negative relationship between the minimum wages and employment, Robbins (2003) 
determined that the minimum wages has not had such a negative effect.  
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discussion of the unemployment rate. García et al. (2007) discuss segmentation comparing 
Mincer regressions for the formal and informal sectors, and García et al. (2008) also use Mincer 
regressions which incorporate differences among cities and sectors. Using Markovian chains 
Mora (2010) discusses the possibility of segmented labor market and finds segmentation in 
professionals workers. Finally, Nupia (1997), Jaramillo et al. (2000) and Gálvis (2002) using time 
series find that there is no cointegration among wages, i.e. there is a segmented labor market. 
 
With respect to the results of the WGM model, we suppose that if there are segmented labor 
markets in a developing country (such as, for example, Colombia), the results of increased 
minimum wage is moderate due to substitution effects between young and older workers. On 
other hand, the total effects on a particular labor market are due to the proportion of young/older 
workers in the economy. Thus, we suppose that the mobility within sectors with a minimum wage 
is not perfect because of the benefits of the minimum wage. Let us assume that the government 
imposes a minimum wage for the formal sector in the economy. Then, an individual’s decision to 
join the informal sector results from comparing the benefits of working in the formal sector versus 
the benefits of working in the informal sector. Now, work in the formal sector consists of a 
standard fixed work time, and the guarantee of social security, pension, and health. The 
opportunity cost of leisure is different for young people and older people because the benefits of 
working in the formal or informal sector are different. It must be noted that the individual decision 
of participating in a specific sector implies considering the formal-informal sector wage ratio and 
produces substitution effects on the labor force.   
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Let us assume that individuals are able to choose whether they want to join the formal or informal 
sector based on a set of variables, Fields (1990), Maloney (2004)3. Therefore, the engagement in 
the informal sector can be estimated as follows: 
 
Ii(t),t * = β0´Si(t),t +β1´NLi(t),t +β2´ Hmalei(t),t + β3´ OUH(t),t + β4´ CMWi(t),t + ηi(t) + µi(t),t  > 0              (1) 
 
t = 1,….,T  ;  i=1,…,N ;  Pi(t),t = 1 if Pi(t),t * > 0                  (2) 
 
Where Ii(t),t * is a latent variable that represents earnings from working in a given sector and Ii(t),t 
equals one when an individual chooses to work in the informal sector or otherwise zero. The “i(t)” 
subscripts indicate that the observations are independent cross-sectional series where N 
individuals are only available in each period. Since there are different individuals in each period, i 
ranges from 1 to N for each t. Deaton (1985) suggests using cohorts to obtain consistent 
estimators of β when numeric variables are used and adjusting the estimator with the 
measurement errors. Moffitt (1993) proposed an IV-probit approach which, in the case of 
independent continuous variables subject to measurement errors, implies using a set of time-
invariant variables and a set of time-variant variables, 
 
Si(t),t          =  λ1´Ci(t) + Z i(t),t  + ω i(t),t                                   (3) 
NLi(t),t        =  λ1´Ci(t) + Z i(t),t  + ω i(t),t                    (4) 
CMWi(t),t    =  λ1´Ci(t) + Z i(t),t  + ω i(t),t                      (5) 
 
Si(t),t represents the number of years of education, which decrease the likelihood of joining the 
informal sector, Magnac (1991), Núñez (2002), Ribero (2003) and Uribe et al. (2006).  NLi(t),t 
                                                 
3 This assumption is fundamental because of the characterization of "easy-entry" and "upper-tier" informal 
employment, Kucera and Roncolato (2008). 
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represents non-labor income, which decreases the likelihood of participating, Núñez (2002), 
Ribero (2003). Hmalei(t),t represents a male head of a household, which increases the likelihood 
of participation in the informal sector, Uribe et al. (2006). 
 
CMWi(t),t  represents the interaction between cohort variables and the minimum wage. In young 
individuals – cohorts 1 to 3 - the opportunity cost of working in the informal sector is low, and we 
expect the sign to be positive when there is an increase in the minimum wage. However, to older 
individuals – cohorts 4 to 6 - the opportunity cost of working in the informal sector is high, and a 
negative sign is expected. OUHi(t),t is a dummy variable that takes a value of either one if there is 
more than one individual unemployed in a household, or otherwise zero. We expected this 
variable to have a positive sign, Arango and Posada (2006). The ηi(t) variable represents the 
deviation of the effect of the cohort after breaking down fixed individual effects. Therefore, if there 
are any fixed individual effects, these will be consistent with fixed effects in the cohort. Finally, 
Ci(t) in (4) to (6) are time-invariant cohorts, whereas Zi(t),t represent time-variant variables. With 
regard to the latter there is no agreement as to which variables should be incorporated in Zi(t),t. 
However, since economic growth is a determining factor when setting the minimum salary, the 
GDP lagged by a period is used as Z i(t),t. It is also worth noting that binary variables will not be 
subject to correction, Deaton (1985).  
 
3. Data 
 
The labor market in Colombia showed an increasing rate of female labor force 
participation from 1981 to 2000. The female labor force participation rose from 36.46 percent in 
1981 to 50.87 percent in 1998. Meanwhile, the male labor participation has remained stagnated 
for the last decades, i.e. 74.28 percent in 1981 and 73.98 percent in 1998 (Luisa Fernanda 
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Bernat, Rocio Ribero and Jaime Tenjo 2004:150). This means that the traditional gender gaps in 
labor force participation decreased in the last century. On the other hand, there has been an 
important decrease in the unemployment rate in the past few years. According to the Colombian 
Department of Statistics (DANE), the unemployment dropped from 16.6 percent in 2000 to 11.4 
percent in 2006.  
 
In Colombia, there are no panel survey statistics on household labor supply data. Our sample 
comes from the National Housing Survey (NHS) which consists of a time series of independent 
and representative cross-sections collected from 2001 to 2005 by the Colombian Department of 
Statistics (DANE). Since 2000, the DANE has collected information about the labor market 
through another mechanism called Continuous Housing Survey. The DANE measures 
engagement in the informal sector based on information about workers or employers who have 
less than 10 workers, independent non-professional, non-technical workers,  housekeepers, and 
family assistants who do not earn monetary compensation. Ribero (2003) proposes four 
definitions and shows how the informal sector share changes substantially depending on each 
definition. His definitions take into account not only company size, but also membership to the 
social security system, an employment agreement, and medical insurance coverage.  
 
Based on DANE's definition of informality, Castillo (2006) estimated informality to be 61 percent 
in 2002 and 58.8 percent in 2005.  However, when the definition does not include the headcount 
size, but the kind of employment agreement or memberships, the informal sector share is 
approximately 30 percent, which was determined by Ribero (2003) and Hernández and Pinzon 
(2006) who found that the informal sector share is about 50 percent based on medical insurance 
coverage. 
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We define "informal" to refer to anyone who does not have social security coverage in health, a 
pension, and a formal employment contract. According to this definition and based on a sample of 
individuals who were engaged in the labor market, we defined six cohorts of  individuals whose 
ages range from 18 to 56 years in the period from 2001 to 2005. Thus, 89,241 individuals were 
selected during the observed period. The means of the selected variables are listed in the table 
below: 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
As shown in Table 1 above, the average number of years of education is close to 10. This 
number seems to have been stable for the past 10 years. Mora and Muro (2008) showed a 
similar average for the period 1995-2000 also using pseudo panel data. Labor income and non-
labor income were adjusted for inflation in each of the metropolitan areas, showing a slight 
improvement probably due to economic growth and the inflation drop. It must also be noted that 
the real minimum wage has been increasing in all metropolitan areas. Other unemployment in the 
households (OUH) has remained stable at nearly 30% throughout the entire period under review. 
The percentage of male heads of households who participate in the informal sector is close to 
10%.4 Finally, there are no substantial differences among the number of individuals each year.  
 
With respect to the wages, we calculated by cohorts and cities the ratio between wages and 
minimum real wages by main cities and found an inverted U. 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
                                                 
4 As shown by Almanza (2006) the gap between men and women in the informal sector has been closing since last 
century. 
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In figure 2, the ratio is increasing in young cohorts and decreasing in old cohorts. Next, we 
explored participation in the informal labor market and found that the informal sector is not 
homogeneous by cohorts and regions. The results are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
Figure 2 shows that the youngest cohort has the highest participation in the informal sector. 
Medellín is the city with the lowest participation in the informal sector rates in each cohort, while 
Cartagena, on the other hand, has the lowest participation in the informal sector in the fourth 
cohort throughout the entire period under review.  
 
4. Results 
 
The estimates by Núñez (2002), Ribero (2003) and Uribe et al. (2006) of participation in 
the informal employment sector were determined only for working individuals. Ribero (2003) 
justifies this selection because there are other models, such as those by Ribero and Meza (1997), 
which specifically represent labor participation in Colombia. Uribe et al. (2006) did not raise any 
special considerations with regard to this. The results of the model of engagement in the informal 
sector are discussed below. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
The first column in Table 2 shows a pooled probit, which is determined based on model (3) for the 
entire sample without considering the existence of a measurement error because of the nature of 
 15 
the pseudo panel. The sign of the years of education is negative and statistically significant. The 
effect of the minimum wage on each cohort is positive and statistically significant on the 
probability of joining the informal sector. Only the last cohort shows negative effects on the 
decision to join the informal sector. The signs of non-labor income are not as expected and 
Hmale was found to be not significant. 
 
The last column in Table 2, instrumental variable probit, shows the estimated probability of joining 
the informal sector using the pseudo panel technique5. Table 2 also discusses the existence of 
selection biases. As indicated by Ribero (2003) and Uribe et al. (2006), estimates of a model of 
engagement in the informal sector for the entire sample of workers led to the occurrence of 
selection biases because the unemployment choice was not considered6.  
 
The existence of such selection biases was corrected by estimating and incorporating Mills 
inverse ratio in model (3). We estimated the likelihood of participating based on the number of 
working individuals in the cohort following the work of Gronau (1974) and Lewis (1974) and Mora 
and Muro (2007). Mora and Muro (2007) showed that it was possible to correct the existence of 
selection biases based on a semi-parametric contrast, which involves incorporating Mills inverse 
ratio. This Mills inverse ratio is calculated from the proportion of the labor participating individuals 
in each cohort with respect to the total number of individuals in the cohorts7.  
 
The results show that all coefficients are statistically significant, and the percentage of success of 
the model is above 66 percent. The years of education and non-labor income have negative 
                                                 
5 The variance-covariance matrix of the IV-probit estimator was corrected using the method proposed by Amemiya 
(1978).  
6 Although Ribero (2003) and Uribe, Ortiz and Castro (2006) are aware of the problem, Ribero (2003) does not 
consider it. Uribe et al. (2003), on the other hand, try to avoid it by proposing a multinomial model which not only fails 
to correct the selection bias, but also raises a discussion about the independence of irrelevant alternatives.   
7 We used 274,162 individuals in all cohorts to estimate the equation of selection (see the appendix for a formal 
derivation of the selection bias). 
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effects on the probability of joining the informal sector. Hmale and OUN variables have a positive 
sign. In order to consider the relationship between minimum wage and informality, dummy 
interactions between the cohorts and the minimum wage were incorporated. We assumed two 
different types of interaction: The first one considers the minimum level, and the second one 
considers the ratio of the wages over minimum wages. Both interactions show that an increase in 
the minimum wage produces an increase of the probability to join the informal sector in young 
cohorts and decreases the probability to join the informal sector in older cohorts. These results 
show an interesting issue: an increase in the minimum wage produces substitution effects among 
young and older individuals in the informal labor market. 8 
 
Finally, the Mills inverse ratio was negative and statistically significant, thus corroborating 
selection bias in the sample. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The engagement of informal workers in the labor market is a topic that has been recently 
discussed in Colombia. Concerning the determining factors of engagement in the informal sector, 
there is only consensus around the assumption that the higher the educational level, the higher 
the incentives to engage in the informal sector, and non-labor income has negative effects.  
 
On the other hand, the standard results of the WGM model in a developing country could be 
moderate if there are substitution effects between young and older workers. The estimates 
discussed in this paper corroborate this negative effect of both education and non-labor income 
on the decision to join the informal sector.  
                                                 
8 Boeri and Garibaldi (2009) show that the regulations in the labor market produce wage differences between 
sectors.   
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Besides having an impact on the distribution of wages among formal and informal workers, 
Arango and Pachón (2004), Maloney and Núñez (2003), Lemos (2007, 2009) 9, the minimum 
wage also generates incentives to join one sector or another. Therefore, the estimates provided 
in this paper show that there are substitution effects on the labor market.  
 
Therefore, we recommend that the political discussion about the elimination of the minimum wage 
in Colombia should incorporate an analysis of the current encouraging factors that have had an 
impact on the Colombian labor market. It is also necessary to conduct a more in-depth discussion 
of advisable policies with respect to the reduction or elimination of the minimum wage in 
Colombia.  
 
                                                 
9 Arango and Pachón (2004), and Maloney and Núñez (2003) did not estimate the effect of minimum wages on the 
informal employment share directly. 
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Appendix 1. Selection bias in Pseudo Panel Data. 
 
In the pseudo panel case with selectivity bias, the cohort expression will be as follows: 
 
E(Ii(t),t | Xi(t),t, Si(t),t=1,gi(t) є Ic)=  
E(X´i(t),t β + τi(t) + µi(t),t |  Xi(t),t , Si(t),t=1,gi(t) є Ic)= 
E(X´i(t),t β|Xi(t),t ,Si(t),t=1,gi(t) є Ic)+E(τi(t) | Xi(t),t , Si(t),t=1,gi(t) є Ic)+E(µi(t),t | Xi(t),tx ,Si(t),t=1,gi(t),t є Ic)       (1A) 
 
Where Ii(t),t is an interest variable in a repeated cross-sectional model with measurement error.10  
And Ii(t),t is only observed when Si(t),t =1. Xi(t),t are covariates; τi(t) are individual effects in t; µi(t),t are 
idiosyncratic errors; i run for individuals. In the above equation, gi(t) є Ic implies that the 
observation i(t), in the appropriate cross section, belongs to a specific cohort, that is, taking 
expectations conditional to i Є c (in random terms gi Є Ic). The data consist of a time series of 
independent cross-sections so we can only observe the same individual in one given period of 
time. The solutions for pseudo panel data show that the direct procedure for the first term in 
equation (1A) implies the use of the sample mean of the variables in the respective cohorts. Mora 
and Muro (2006, 2007) shows that the second term becomes zero while the deviation of the 
cohort is independent from the selection process. There is, however, no guarantee that the last 
term equals zero, which shows that the estimator is inconsistent when there is a potential 
selection bias. Because the selection process does not affect the presence or absence of a 
cohort in a specific cross section, cohorts will comprise a set of different individuals in each 
repeated cross section, and the presence of different individuals in each cross-section is 
independent from the incidental truncation process. Therefore, a random selection of 
representative samples of each sub-population of cohorts will contain different individuals in each 
cross section. This makes it necessary to find an expression that allows inferring the behavior of 
a cohort based on the behavior of different individuals in the cohort. Thus, the last expression in 
equation (1A) is, 
 
E(µi(t),t| Xi(t),t , Si(t),t=1,gi(t),t є Ic) = E(Ri(t),t| gi(t),t є Ic)                                                            (2A) 
 
In equation (2A) above, Ri(t),t is Mills inverse ratio, which shows the transformation of individual 
results into cohort results. It is worth noting that if the nature of the selection process is known, 
then it is possible to use individual parameters (estimated for the selection process) and apply 
them to the means of the cohort to obtain a selection indicator for each cohort. To evaluate the 
expression in (2A) Mora and Muro (2007) proposed calculating Mills inverse ratio for the normit of 
a consistent estimation of the observed proportion of individuals in each cohort, instead of 
integrating out the individual Mills inverse ratio for all the observed individuals in each cohort,. In 
particular in the following cases:   
 
E(Ri(t),t| gi(t),t є Ic) ∝  φ(Pc,t)/Φ (Pc.t)               (3A) 
 
In (3A) equation Pc,t is the proportion of individuals selected from cohort c in t time. Finally this 
expansion of the original specification with a selectivity bias correction term for equation 3 
implies, 
 
I i(t),t = X´ i(t),t  β + τ i(t)  + R´ i(t),t  ρ + ψ i(t),t  ;  E( ψ i(t),t  τ i(t) , X i(t),t  + S i(t),t  ) = 0                              (4A) 
                                                 
10 That is, over all individuals in a specific cohort.  
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Then a contrast about the existence of selection biases involves contrasting the hypothesis of a 
lack of significance of ρ in (4A), that is, a contrast implies the use of a Wald test of H0: ρ=0 as a 
test of the null hypothesis of absence of sample selection bias. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics (means). 
Variable/Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001-2005 
Years of education 9.85 9.99 10.17 10.32 10.43 10.15 
Non-labor income 60.3 78.05 88.66 98.1 112.65 87.76 
Inflation (13 metropolitan areas) 8.35% 6.32% 7.78% 5.99% 5.03% 6.44% 
Minimum wage (thousand Col$) 286 309 332 358 381.5 333.75 
Real minimum wage (thousand Col$) 262.11 289.46 306.16 336.52 362.3 311.79 
Other individuals unemployed at home 36.07% 34.67% 31.61% 29.41% 27. 63% 31.84% 
Male head of a household 9.84% 9.73% 10.90% 11.13% 11.93% 10.72% 
Informality 44.51% 44.60% 44.74% 43.65% 43.71% 44.26% 
Number of individuals 18,136 17,348 17,415 17,444 18,898 89,241 
Source:  Authors' calculations from The National Housing Survey (DANE-ECH).  
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Figure 1. Wages by Cohorts. 
Evolution of Wages in Colombia: 2001-2005
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Source:  Authors' calculations from The National Housing Survey (DANE-ECH).  
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Figure 2. Informal sector rate by cohorts. 
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Source: Authors' calculations from The National Housing Survey (DANE-ECH).  
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Table 2. Marginal effects for informal workers. 
Variable / Model Pool-Probit IV-Probit  IV-Probit  IV-Probit  
Education -0.0641845 -0.0322842 -0.0679544 -0.0838423 
 (0.00049) ** (-0.0002752)**  (0.004143) ** (0. 0048275) ** 
Non-labor income 0.0000162 -0.0002752 -0.0004799 -0.0004305 
 (0.000003)**  (-14.99)** (0.000062)** (0.0000727)** 
Hmale 0.0025179 0.0650612 0.1824889 0. 1568135 
 (0.00621)** (0.0225352) ** (0.0220179) ** (0.0265475) ** 
OUN 0.0534534 0.0812005 0.0369982 0.0458268 
 (0.00399) ** (0.0045363)** (0.0047308)** (0.005519)** 
C1*MWR 0.0008334  0.0011671 0.3771594 
 (0.00003)**  (0.0000304)** (0.0108374)** 
C2*MWR 0.0005139  0.0004916 0.1079831    
 (0.00003)**  (0.0000327)** (0.0084813)** 
C3*MWR 0.0002682  0.0000816 0.0146035 
 (0.00003)**  (0.0000319)** (0.0069588)* 
C4*MWR 0.0001266  -0.0001284 -0.0356545 
 (0.00003)**  (0.0000318)** (0.0062999)** 
C5*MWR 0.0000634  -0.0002017 -0.0465519 
 (0.00003)**  (0.0000324)** (0.0058238)** 
C6*MWR -0.0001509  -0.0002936 -0.057555 
 (0.00003)**  (0.0000334)** (0.005562)** 
Mills  -1.443092 -4.800297 -5.564868    
  (0.09062)** (0.1145766)** (0.1296018)** 
χ2 (10) =22643.98 (5) =1042.01 (11) =5130.71 (11) =5175.88 
% Success 70.78% 58.86% 68.47% 66.31% 
N 89,241 89,241 89,241 89,241 
Source. Authors' calculations from The National Housing Survey (DANE-ECH).  
Note: Dummy variables for cities are included in all regressions. Standard errors in parenthesis. *:  p< .05; **:  p< .01. 
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